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Past the Pall of Orthodoxy: Why the First
Amendment Virtually Guarantees Online
Law School Graduates Will Breach the
ABA Accreditation Barrier
Nick Dranias*
I.

Introduction

Despite accelerating technological advances, the American Bar
Association (ABA) still has not accredited an online JD program or
Internet law school.' This recalcitrance punishes people for choosing an
online education and excludes marginalized populations from pursuing a
legal career.2 When enforced by state laws that restrict bar admission
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, competent
lawyers and law students are barred from practicing law for no other
reason than their choice of educational medium. Thus, online legal
education is necessarily devalued and diminished.
Such media
discrimination violates the First Amendment and creates a serious
constitutional dilemma for those states that restrict bar eligibility to
graduates of ABA-accredited schools.
The impact of the constitutional dilemma created by the ABA's
aversion to Internet schooling is widespread. Currently, eighteen states
and two U.S. territories-including such states as Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, and New Jersey-restrict bar exam eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools. 3 Additionally, twenty-nine states and one
* Staff Attorney, Institute for Justice Minnesota Chapter. I would like to thank my
wife for her crucial support in allowing me to focus on completing this Article after hours
and despite a newborn and a rambunctious two year old. I would also like to thank Chip
Mellor, Lee McGrath and all of my colleagues at the Institute for Justice for encouraging
and enabling me to write this Article.
1. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
3. NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS

Chart III (2006), available at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/
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U.S. territory restrict admission to practice on motion (without requiring
an exam) to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. 4 Moreover, many
of these restrictions are absolute, with state supreme courts expressly or
implicitly refusing to recognize a waiver process for bar applicants.5
Although numerous lawsuits have been filed in ultimately failed
efforts to strike down bar admission rules that restrict eligibility to
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, 6 none has challenged the
ABA-accreditation requirement based on the First Amendment's
7
prohibition on media discrimination.7 This Article
makes that case. 8
CompGuide/2007CompGuide.pdf.
4. Id. at Chart VIII.
5. See, e.g., In re Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 (Alaska 1980); People ex rel. Darley v.
Carr, 43 P. 128, 129-30 (Colo. 1895); Application of Courtney, 294 A.2d 569, 573
(Conn. 1972); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs In re Hale, 433 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1983); In
re Adams, 700 P.2d 194, 195 (N.M. 1985). Additionally, with the little-noticed repeal of
the hardship waiver provision of Rule IB(6) of the State of Minnesota Rules for
Admission to the Bar during 1998, it appears an ABA-accreditation restriction may now
be strictly enforced without exception in Minnesota despite the state supreme court's
prior history of considering waiver petitions. Compare In re Dolan, 445 N.W.2d 553,
558 (Minn. 1989) (waiving admission requirements to applicant with thirty-three years of
experience), with Minn. Sup. Ct. Order No. C5-84-2139 (Aug. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/9808/blerules.htm (promulgating new
rules for admission to the Bar and repealing earlier Rules of the Minnesota Supreme
Court and State Board of Law Examiners for admission to the Bar).
6. See, e.g., Moore v. Sup. Ct. of S.C., 447 F. Supp. 527, 534 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd,
577 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978) (holding strict scrutiny
was not required in evaluating an ABA-accreditation requirement because it did not
involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right); Murphy v. State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 429 F. Supp. 16, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that the state supreme court rule
requiring bar examination applicants to have graduated from ABA-accredited law schools
was not subject to strict scrutiny because the classification was not suspect, involving
race, creed, or alienage, or "invidious discrimination against an insular minority"); Potter
v. N.J. Sup. Ct., 403 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (D.N.J. 1975), aJd, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir.
1976) (holding that adoption of standards of approving body is not the same as delegation
of power pursuant to the state constitution); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 433 So.2d at 972
(holding that the court made a rational decision to follow standards developed by the
ABA); In re Application of Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 441 U.S. 938 (1979) (rejecting challenge to ABA-accreditation requirements).
See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Enactment, Implementation, or Repeal of Formal Educational Requirement for
Admission to the Bar, 44 A.L.R. 4th 910 (2007).
7. See generally Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Licensing and Regulation of
Attorneys, with Respect to Matters Other Than Advertisements, as Restricted by Rights of
Free Speech, Expression, and Association under Federal Constitution's First
Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2006).
8. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that this Article discusses the ABA's
law school accreditation rules in the context of a conceivable challenge against states that
adopt them through bar eligibility requirements. This Article does not herald a possible
legal challenge to the ABA itself, nor does it discuss possible legal theories involving
constitutional or statutory claims other than those based on the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
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Part II of this Article explains why the Internet is at least as robust
an educational medium as face-to-face communication. 9 Part III explains
how the ABA's standards on accreditation-even considering the ABA's
variance procedure-presumptively prohibit online JD programs and
Part IV contends that such prejudice constitutes
schools.' 0
unconstitutional media discrimination that interferes with liberty of
Part V rebuts anticipated state
circulation and academic freedom."
action defenses to the proposed media discrimination theory. 12 Part VI
discusses how a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which applied heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment to bar
admission rules, supports the theory that states cannot absolutely bar
graduates of online JD programs from practicing law without violating
the First Amendment.' 3
In short, this Article will explain why states that absolutely restrict
bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited schools should anticipate
lawsuits charging them with a constitutionally unjustifiable prejudice
against the Internet as an educational medium.
The Internet Is Now at Least as Robust an Educational Medium as
Face-to-Face Communication

II.

"The breakneck pace of growth in Internet-based distance learning"
should not be too surprising. ' 4 The Internet enables twenty-four-seven
educational communication that crosses hundreds and even thousands of
miles-allowing students who would otherwise have no such opportunity
to learn from the best professors in the nation.' 5 Such accessibility taps
vast reservoirs of unmet demand in marginalized populationsminorities, the poor, the disabled, the remote, and those who face

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

14-25 and accompanying text.
28-40 and accompanying text.
41-65 and accompanying text.
66-85 and accompanying text.
86-115 and accompanying text.

14.
INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y, QUALITY ON THE LINE: BENCHMARKS FOR
DISTANCE
LEARNING
vii (2000), available at
SUCCESS
IN INTERNET-BASED

http://www.ihep.com/Pubs/PDF/Quality.pdf.
15. Id., at 14 (discussing "high number of excellent faculty teaching Internet-based
distance education courses"); Ulrich Boser, Learning in Legal Limbo, U.S. NEWS &
at
60,
available
at
Oct.
20,
2003,
WORLD
REPORT,

(reporting
that
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/articles/031020/20good.b.htm
Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School taught Civil Procedure at Concord Law
School); Tony Mauro, All-Online Law School Challenges Precedents, U.S.A. TODAY,
Oct. 12, 1999, at 6A, available at 1999 WLNR 3299963; Mount St. Joseph Goes Online,
ASSISTANT
TODAY,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 29-33, available at
LEGAL
http://www.legalassistanttoday.com/issuearchive/001ndex.htm for purchase (observing
the usefulness of online learning for "armed forces all over Europe").
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16
responsibilities that make traditional day or night school impossible.
The accelerating growth rate of online schooling also reflects
recognition of the increasingly robust nature of Internet information
technologies at delivering educational content. Online schools have the
capacity to broadcast lectures combined with live-blogging, chat rooms
or bulletin boards.' 7 Recently, a virtual classroom in which students
could interact with each other and professors through "avatars"graphical representations of themselves-was deployed for a lecture
program at Harvard Law School. 18 In the near future, educators foresee
the use of existing software that presently allows for massively
multiplayer gaming in such a way that students could learn through
simulated experiments and interaction with historical figures and settings

16. Kevin Deutsch, Online Degree at Nova Helps Mom Achieve Her Goal, MIAMI
HERALD, July 13, 2003, at 1B (reporting "[blalancing the demands of working for another
degree with raising her four month old daughter was something only an online degree
program could help her achieve"); Kate Schott, Lack of Bar No Bar to Enrollment at
Online Law School, CHI. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 14; Karla Schuster, For NSULaw School, A
Virtual Innovation; NonqualifiersGet 2nd Chance Online, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 2001,
at 11B (observing online program expected to boost minority participation); STATEMENT
OF COMMITMENT BY THE REGIONAL ACCREDITING COMMISSIONS FOR THE EVALUATION OF
ELECTRONICALLY OFFERED DEGREE AND CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS i (Jan. 28, 2002),

available at http://www.ncahlc.org/download/CRACStatementDEd.pdf (observing
"[tihis phenomenon is creating opportunities to serve new student clienteles and to better
serve existing populations and it is encouraging innovation throughout the academy").
Cf George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA
Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2094 (1998) (arguing
"[b]y suppressing potential new schools that would offer cheaper, more-efficient legal
education, the system has excluded many from the legal profession, particularly the poor
and minorities. It has raised the cost of legal services. And it has, in effect, denied legal
services to whole segments of our society"); INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y, supra note
14, at 16-17 (discussing how online coursework facilitates collaboration).
17. Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School
Revolutionize TraditionalLaw School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 851-67
(2000) (discussing technologies used at Concord's online law school); Boser, supra note
15, at 60; Schott, supra note 16, at 14; Weekend All Things Considered: Country's First
Online Law School (NPR radio broadcast November 24, 2002), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=854953 (reporting "within two
sessions you become so familiar with the process and it goes so smoothly you feel you're
in a classroom, you feel you're interacting with the other students, and you feel the
teacher is interacting with you").
18. Wagner James Au, Everything Goes Better With Daleks, NEW WORLD NOTES,
May 16, 2006, http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/05/everything.goes.html (reporting a talk
at Harvard Law School hosted by public radio personality Christopher Lydon); see
generally CARLO BONAMICO & FABIO LAVAGETTO, VIRTUAL TALKING HEADS FOR TELE-

EDUCATION APPLICATIONS 8 (2001) (Digital Signal Proc. Lab, Depart. of Informatics [sic]
Systems & Telecomm., U. Genova, June 15, 2001), available at http://www.dsp.dist.
unige.it/publications/bonamico-lavagetto-ssgrr200l-final.pdf (reporting "we can imagine
the creation of a 3D virtual classroom where not only the tutor is represented by an
avatar, but also other students that are accessing the system at the same time.., the
virtual presence of other classmates would improve the didactic interaction between the
students, and give the possibility to do more complex exercises").
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in virtual reality-possibly even legal questioning from a virtual Socrates
himself.' 9 With advances like these, and still more in the pipeline,2 °
there is little doubt the Internet is a vastly more promising educational
medium than correspondence, closed-circuit television, and, perhaps,
even face-to-face communication.
In fact, there is a mounting collection of academic studies that
shows the educational success of modem Internet schooling equals or
exceeds that of bricks and mortar schooling. 2 1 Moreover, the California
19. Joel Foreman, Next-Generation: Educational Technology versus the Lecture,
EDUCAUSE REV., July-Aug. 2003, at 16, available at http://www.educause.edu/ir/
library/pdf/erm0340.pdf.
20. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, VISIONS 2020 TRANSFORMING EDUCATION AND
TRAINING THROUGH ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2002) (discussing goal of creating "a

tele-immersive environment for teaching and learning" consisting of "a three dimensional
virtual space, which mimics the real space both visually, aurally and tactually ...one in
which both the student/apprentice and teacher/master can meet and interact"), available
at http://www.technology.gov/reports/TechPolicy/2020Visions.pdf.
21. See, e.g., S. Junaidu & J. AlGhamdi, Comparative Analysis of Face-to Face and
Online Course Offerings: King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals Experience,
INT'L J. INSTRUCTIONAL

TECH.

& DISTANCE LEARNING, Apr. 2004,

available at

http://www.itdl.org/Journal/Apr_04/article03.htm
(comparing "face-to-face
(F2F)
teaching and online facilitation of a Data Structures course" and finding that the mode of
educational communication had no significant impact on the quality of educational
outcomes); Constance H. McLaren, A Comparison of Student Persistence and
Performance in Online and Classroom Business Statistics Experiences, DECISION SCI. J.
INNOVATIVE EDUC., Spring 2004, at 7-8 (reporting results of case study comparing
traditional and online teaching of business statistics that indicated online students
dropped out of class more often than traditional students but that more students
participated in online courses and also that the performance of online students who
remained in the class was the same as traditional students); Margaret Johnson,
Introductory Biology Online, Assessing Outcomes of Two Student Populations,J. C. SCI.
TEACHING, Feb. 2002, at 312 (reporting no significant difference between educational
outcomes of online versus traditional students); John Dutton, Marilyn Dutton & Jo Perry,
Do Online Students Perform as Well as Lecture Students?, J. ENGINEERING EDUC., Jan.
2001, at 131-36, available at 2001 WLNR 4449628 (reporting that "results demonstrate
that online students can perform at least as well as traditional students"); M.O.
Thirunarayanan & Aixa Perez-Prado, Comparing Web-based and Classroom-based
Learning: A Quantitative Study, J. RES. COMPUTING EDUC., Winter 2001-2002, at 136
(reporting that while the online group scored slightly better that the campus group on the
class posttest, the difference in performance was not statistically significant); M. Hosein
Fallah & Robert Ubell, Blind Scores in a Graduate Test: Conventional Compared with
Web-based Outcomes, ALN MAG., Dec. 2000, available at http://www.sloanc.org/publications/magazine/v4n2/fallah.asp; Peter Navarro & Judy Shoemaker,
Performance and Perceptions of Distance Learners in Cyberspace, Am. J. Distance
Educ., Vol. 14 No. 2 (2000), available at http://web.gsm.uci.edu/-navarro/Vita05/
JA%2015%20Performance%20and%20Perceptions%2OoP/o20Distance.pdf.
(reporting
from a study of several hundred undergraduate macroeconomics students that "[t]he
results strongly suggest that Cyberleamers can learn as well or better than Traditional
Learners regardless of entering characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, academic
background, computer skills, or academic aptitude and do so with a high degree of
'customer satisfaction"'); Robert LaRose, Jennifer Gregg & Matt Eastin, Audiographic
Telecoursesfor the Web: An Experiment Telecommunication, J. OF COMPUTER MEDIATED
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State Board of Bar Examiners has long permitted graduates of online
schools to sit for its bar exam,22 which is known as one of the most
Even the ABA accredits online
difficult exams in the country.23
programs in paralegal studies and health law; 24 and it also recently
allowed law schools such as Cornell to coordinate with other law schools
in offering limited online courses in copyright and social security law.25
These facts justify close scrutiny of the classification of online law
schooling as just another form of highly restricted correspondence-style
"distance learning" under the ABA's law school accreditation standards.
III.

The ABA's Accreditation Standards Facially Discriminate Against
Internet Schooling

Much has been made of the ABA's recent decision to adopt
diversity standards for the accreditation of law schools at its August 2006
annual conference.26 Less noticed were new interpretative statements
suggesting that the ABA might consider variances from its accreditation
standards for "experimental programs. 27 Such rhetoric may or may not
CoMM., Dec. 1998, available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol4/issue2/larose.html
(observing "the results supported the audiographic telecourse model as a potentially costeffective approach to distributing courses over the Web"). See generally INST. FOR
HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y, supra note 14, at 16-17 (discussing "high score" in interactivity for
online education case studies); Adam Liptak, Forget Socrates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2004, § 4A, at 34 (reporting pass rates at the Concord online law school are the same on
the California bar as bricks and mortar schools).
22. Cal. Ct. R. Reg. Admission Prac. VII, § 2(b)(4), XIX, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/Rules-Regulating-Admissions52204.pdf
(2006); THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA BAR EXAMINATION INFORMATION
AND HISTORY 2, http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/Bar-Exam-Info-History.pdf
(stating "[u]nlike most other states, California allows graduates from a variety of
different types of law schools to take the bar examination ... [including] distance
learning and online law schools") (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
23. James Bandler, Raising The Bar: Even Top Lawyers Fail California Exam,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2005, at Al (reporting California bar exam has a fifty-six percent
failure rate, far higher than national average of thirty-six percent); Highest Pass Rate
Since 1965 ForFebruary'sState Bar Exam, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 28, 1992, at
A20 (reporting California bar exam is one of the toughest in the country).
24. Tranette Ledford, ParalegalsGo Beyond Law Offices, DECISION TIMES, Mar. 6,
2006, at 6, available at http://staging.armytimes.com/story.php?f=-292313-1531405.php;
Deutsch, supra note 16, at 1B; LEGAL ASSISTANT TODAY, supra note 16, at 29-33.
25. Memorandum from Peter W. Martin to John A. Sebert, ABA Consultant on
Legal Education, A Report on the LII's Two Multi-Law School Courses Conducted Via
the Internet in 2000-2001, Dec. 7, 2001, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
distanceeducation/lii.html.
26. Matt Krupnick, Law Schools Must Increase Diversity, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2006, at A3.
27. Memorandum from John A. Sebert, Consultant on Legal Education, to Deans of
ABA Approved Law Schools (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/commentsstandards2006/standardsmMarkup2,5,8.pdf (identifying the
"two primary circumstances" justifying a variance as "the existence of extraordinary
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be a step towards recognizing the reality of Internet-based education, but
it is clear that the ABA's accreditation standards still facially
discriminate against Internet schooling by lumping it together with less
robust forms of so-called "distance learning" and restricting it even more
than "study outside of the classroom."
"Distance learning," as defined by ABA Standard 306, has long
been the category in which the ABA placed online JD programs and
Internet schooling-alongside correspondence schooling and instruction
by closed-circuit television.2 8 As such, the ABA: 1) prohibits "distance
learning" during the first year of law school; 29 and 2) restricts "distance
learning" to no more than four hours per semester, up to a grand total of
twelve hours.3a Consequently, under normal circumstances, not even a
single semester of classes can be conducted entirely online if a school
desires ABA accreditation.
Significantly, the ABA's standards restrict "distance learning" to
fewer credit hours than are permitted for what the ABA regards as "study
outside of the classroom," such as internships and/or independent
research-despite the fact that such "study" can be totally noninteractive between instructor and student (or student and student).3 '
This relative favoritism for "study outside of the classroom" exists
despite the fact that "ample interaction" is required between student and
instructor for any form of "distance learning. 3 2 Such favoritism proves
that the justification for the ABA's restrictions on the use of the Internet
cannot be a lack of sufficient instructor-student interactivity-or even
social interaction in general. 3
In short, on their face, the ABA's accreditation standards facially
circumstances (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) that made it impossible for a school to comply
with specific standards, or a well-structured experimental program that, among other
benefits, might provide useful evidence to consider in eventually making revisions of the
Standards").
28. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO B., ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL

OF

LAW

SCHOOLS

25-26,

Standard

306(b)

(2005-06),

available at

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2005-2006standardsbook.pdf [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].

29. Id. at 26, Standard 306(e).
30. Id. at Standard 306(d).
31. "Study outside of the classroom" other than "distance learning" can consist of up
to 13,000 instruction minutes of the required 58,000 instruction minutes. See ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 21-25, Standards 304 and 305.
32. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 26, Standard 306(c)(1).
33. Even if Internet schooling were creatively combined with "study outside of the
classroom," no more than a grand total of thirty-one credit hours could be earned in this
manner (based on 700 minutes per credit hour) out of a required eighty-three credit hours.
This would restrict even the most creative Internet school to providing little more than
two semesters of off-site education-and, even then, only for second and third year
students. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 21-27, Standards 304, 305, and 306.
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bar JD degree programs that are conducted fully or even substantially
online regardless of whether the school is otherwise able to meet the
ABA's library and office infrastructure, teacher-studentfaculty ratios,
interactivity or financial requirements. Such discrimination against the
Internet as a medium of educational communication is not overcome by
the possibility of petitioning for a "variance" under ABA accreditation
standard 802. 34 This is because the exercise of such authority is entirely
discretionary and the failure and refusal to meet ABA standards is
"prima facie" evidence justifying the denial of a variance application.35
As there is little question that an online JD program would, at minimum,
violate ABA Standards 304, 305 and 306, the ABA would have complete
discretion to deny an online school's application for a variance.36
Not surprisingly, the ABA has repeatedly stated that it has no plans
to accredit online JD programs.37 Although that stance may be softening,
the ABA has not disavowed it. 38 And while changes to Standard 802
adopted at the August 2006 ABA annual meeting suggest that the ABA
might be willing to waive certain accreditation restrictions on a case-bycase basis with respect to an appropriately qualified "experimental
program,, 39 even a more liberally construed variance process is still a
variance process. As the ABA's accreditation standards are currently
34. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 47, Standard 802. The Standard states that,
[a] law school proposing to offer a program of legal education a portion of
which is inconsistent with a Standard may apply for a variance. If the Council
finds that the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the general purposes of
the Standards, the Council may grant the variance and shall impose the
conditions and time limits it considers appropriate.
Id.
35. Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. ABA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7033, at *50-51 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding "Standard 802 vests in the ABA Council the sole discretion of
determining whether a proposed variance is 'consistent' with 'the purpose of the
Standards').
36. Id.
37. Dan Camevale, Bar Association Seeks to Ease Rules on Distance Educationfor
Law Schools, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 5, 2002, at 32 (reporting the following
statement by Barry A. Currier, former deputy consultant to the legal-education section of
the ABA: "We're moving slowly-this [Standard 306] isn't going to authorize any law
school to have a juris-doctor program through distance education.... It provides a lot
more flexibility than schools had."); Liptak, supra note 21, at 34 (reporting "John A.
Sebert, a bar association official, says it has no plans to accredit a completely virtual law
school, though it has recently allowed traditional law schools to offer limited online
courses").
38. The ABA website presently states "[c]urrently, there are not any law schools
approved by the ABA that provide a J.D. degree completely via correspondence study.
In fact, the ABA's general policy under Standard 304(f) states that 'a law school shall not
grant credit for study by correspondence.' However, there are exceptions to the general
rule." ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO B., Standard 306: Distance
Education, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/distanceeducation/distance.html.
39. See supra note 27.
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structured, they presumptively-and facially-discriminate against
online educational communication for no other reason than it occurs
online.40
IV.

By Restricting Access to the Bar to Graduates of ABA-Accredited
Schools, the State is Discriminating Against the Internet as a
Medium of Educational Communication and Interfering with
Liberty of Circulation and Academic Freedom

In view of the anti-online education bias of the ABA's accreditation
standards, an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools reduces the amount of Internet speech and
association in legal education by drying up the market for online schools
and JD programs. It does so by barring graduates of online law schools
and JD programs from working in their chosen profession in a given
jurisdiction, which destroys a substantial part of the value of a JD degree.
This, in turn, creates a significant financial disincentive for would-be
lawyers to participate in online JD programs. Naturally, the reduction in
market demand for online JD programs diminishes the amount of
Internet speech and association in legal education offered by both online
and "bricks-and-mortar" schools. Given that over a third of state
jurisdictions restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools, 4 1 the aggregate adverse effect of these admission rules on
Internet speech and association is undoubtedly substantial.
Such government-enforced prejudice against Internet legal
education cannot be sustained under the First Amendment. The time
when the ability to practice law was deemed a mere privilege
ungoverned by constitutional considerations ended long ago. 42 When a
state enacts laws that discriminate against a particular medium of
communication in favor of other favored media, such laws generally run
afoul of the First Amendment. 43 Moreover, the Internet is now widely
40. Cf Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts On Academic Freedom: Urofsky And Beyond,
33 U. TOL. L. REV. 257, 263 (2001) (observing "[t]he accreditation process... tends to
discourage the use of distance learning technologies").
41. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
42. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a constitutionally
protected liberty and property interest in pursuing a legal career and, more specifically, in
sitting for the bar exam. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373
U.S. 96 (1963) (holding state cannot deny application for bar admission without a due
process hearing). And the Supreme Court has recognized the practice of law as a
protected privilege under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Barnard v. Thorstenn,
489 U.S. 546 (1989).
43. See generally City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). The Court held that,
[o]ur prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an
entire medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that
completely banned the distribution of pamphlets within the municipality,
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recognized as an important medium, if not the "No. 1 media. 4 4 There is
no exception from the First Amendment for laws that discriminate
against the Internet.4 5
For example, in The Pitt News v. Pappert,the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a law preventing certain advertisers from running
paid-but not unpaid-ads in a college newspaper was unconstitutional
because "the Supreme Court recognized long ago that laws that impose
special financial burdens on the media or a narrow sector of the media
present a threat to the First Amendment. '' 4 6
And in
ForSaleByOwner.com v. Zinnemann, a federal district court held the
State "cannot make arbitrary distinctions based on the manner of speech
or the media used for publication" and struck down an effort by
California to regulate the Internet differently than the print media with
respect to home sale advertisements.4 7 Based on this precedent, states
face claims for media discrimination when they enforce the ABA's
presumption against online law schooling. Moreover, as discussed
below, to successfully defend admission rules that restrict bar eligibility
to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, states need to overcome
heightened scrutiny. This is because media discrimination in a university
setting implicates First Amendment precedent that strongly protects
liberty of circulation and academic freedom.
A.

The Doctrine of Liberty of CirculationStands Against Absolutist
Admission Rules that Restrict Bar Eligibility to Graduatesof ABAAccredited Law Schools
Liberty of circulation doctrine requires courts to strictly scrutinize

handbills on the public streets, the door-to-door distribution of literature, and
live entertainment. Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be
completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to
the freedom of speech is readily apparent-by eliminating a common means of
speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.
Id. at 55 (citations omitted); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding "[w]hile the First
Amendment may tolerate speech regulations that 'ban [a] particular manner or type of
expression at a given time or place,' it does not accommodate regulations which ban
completely a particular manner of expression") (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
44. Candace Lombardi, Study: Web is the No. 1 Media, CNET NEWS.COM, June 5,
2006,
http://news.com.com/study+west+is+the+no.+1 +media/2100-1024_3-6080280.
html.
45. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (holding "our cases provide no basis
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium").
46. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 102-03 (3rd Cir. 2004).
47. ForSaleByOwner.com v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
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under the First Amendment regulations that restrict highly effective
means of circulating information even if they are content-neutral and
aimed at the secondary effects of the regulated conduct.48 InSchneider
v. State, for example, the Court struck down a licensing law for handbill
distribution.49 In doing so, the Court rejected "secondary effect"
concerns about reducing the amount of litter, stating "pamphlets50 have
proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion.,
Although the doctrine has been most often applied in situations
involving print media and prior restraints, it has also been extended to
regulations that undermine free speech across modern transmission
media in more subtle ways. In Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County,
for example, the doctrine was recently invoked to strike down an
ordinance that gave equal-access to a portion of a cable company's
infrastructure to competing Internet service providers as a condition of
the company maintaining or receiving a cable franchise. 5 1 This "openaccess" ordinance not only overrode the editorial discretion of cable
companies, it effectively subsidized competing media by allowing
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to supplement their existing
infrastructure with infrastructure that would otherwise be unavailable to
them.52
In defense of its regulatory scheme, the county government argued
that the First Amendment was not implicated because the ordinance
constituted economic regulation of a transmission facility that ensured
48. See generally Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960). The Court held
that,
[t]his ordinance simply bars all handbills under all circumstances anywhere that
do not have the names and addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance
requires. There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would
tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression. 'Liberty of circulatingis as essential to that freedom as liberty of
publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little
value.'
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf Linmark Assoc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (suggesting that content neutrality would not save law banning
signage that required use of less effective media); William E. Lee, Modernizing The Law
Of Open-Air Speech: The Hughes Court And The Birth Of Content-Neutral Balancing,
13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 1219, 1250-51 (2005) (discussing how content neutrality
did not save ordinances from heightened scrutiny under the liberty of circulation
doctrine).
49. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-64 (1939) (holding "[t]o require a
censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution
of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees").
50. Id.; see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
51. Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 687-88 (S.D. Fla.

2000).
52. The related ordinance was passed "at the prompting of GTE, a telephone
company offering competing services." Id. at 686.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

more, rather than less, speech.53 The Honorable Judge Donald M.
Middlebrooks rejected this argument, observing, "[liberty of circulating
is not confined to newspapers and periodicals, pamphlets and leaflets, but
also to delivery of information by means of fiber optics, microprocessors
and cable.... Under the First Amendment, government should not
interfere with the process by which preferences for information
evolve."5 4 The Court also held that, for information to circulate freely as
intended under the First Amendment, the marketplace of ideas must be
protected from regulations that interfere "with the ability of market
participants to use different cost structures and economic approaches
based upon the inherent advantages and disadvantages of their respective
technology. '55
A bar admission rule that discriminates against online JD programs
similarly creates significant economic incentives that favor face-to-face
educational communication over online communication. Like the openaccess regulation in Comcast Cablevision, such a rule dictates the
structure of the educational market without regard to the inherent
advantages or disadvantages of the respective media of communication.
This interference distorts the free flow of information that would
otherwise occur in the quintessential marketplace of ideas, thereby
violating the doctrine of liberty of circulation as applied in Comcast
Cablevision. And such distortion has substantive consequences for
educational speech.
As paraphrased by Judge Middlebrooks in Comcast Cablevision, "to
a substantial extent, 'the medium is the message.,' 56 Put another way,
substantial regulatory interference with communication mediaespecially highly effective
media-ossifies
the content of
communication by impeding the dissemination of ideas and thereby
skewing the results of competition in the marketplace of ideas in favor of
the established orthodoxy. Likewise, educational orthodoxy is reinforced
by bar admission rules that diminish the diversity of educational voices
by exclusively recognizing the ABA's "one size fits all" 57 accreditation
process. From this perspective, it is not surprising that many scholars
decry the uniformity of the curricular content of ABA-accredited law
schools. 58 For this reason, the kind of strict scrutiny usually reserved for
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

691.
696-97.
693.
692 (citing MARSHALL MCLUAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION

OF MAN (McGraw-Hill 1964)).

57. Quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: ProfessionalInterests and Public
Values, 34 IND. L. REv. 23, 28 (2000).
58. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of
Association: Why the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutionaland Law Schools Aren't
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content-based speech regulation is appropriate for regulations that
substantially interfere with liberty of circulation, including bar admission
rules that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools. 59 Such scrutiny is also triggered by the constitutional protection
of academic freedom.
B.

The Protection ofAcademic Freedom Requires Refrainingfrom
RestrictingBar Eligibility to GraduatesofABA-Accredited Law
Schools

It is well-established that free speech and association in an academic
setting are protected by the First Amendment. 60 Indeed, the rhetoric used
to emphasize the importance of such academic freedom in the university
setting is rarely matched elsewhere. For example, in their concurrence to
Wiemen v. Updegraff Justices Frankfurther and Douglas wrote:
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the
primary grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is
therefore not to indulge in hyperbole ....
They must be free to sift
evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that
restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding
and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of
inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States against infraction by National or State government. The
functions of educational institutions in our national life and the
conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them
are
61

at the basisof these limitations upon State and Nationalpower.

Expressive Associations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J., 415, 419-23 (2005) (observing
"[e]ven more astounding than the number of law schools, however, is the remarkable lack
of diversity of approaches among law schools"); Lawrence C. Foster, The Impact of the
Close Relationship Between American Law Schools and the PracticingBar, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 346, 347 (2001) (observing "[t]he first-year curriculum is nearly identical at all
American law schools: legal writing and research, contract law, property law, criminal
law, torts, and civil procedure, with some law schools also introducing aspects of
constitutional law. In the second and third year, most courses are elective").
59. Cf Comcast Cablevision, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (holding "this case falls within
the rule of Tornillo, Minneapolis Star and TribuneCo., and Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. and
therefore strict scrutiny is required"); see also Dennis R. Williams & W. Thomas Fisher,
The Role of Freedom of Speech in the "Open Access " Debate, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 796,
808 (2001) (supporting strict scrutiny applied in Comcast Cablevision).
60. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-83, 196-97 (1972). There is, however, some
controversy as to whether a law school entails the sort of academic setting that is
analogous to a traditional university or whether it is essentially a trade school. See
Morriss, supra note 58. In light of the content of the typical law review article and the
requirements typically imposed on faculty to conduct academic research and seek
publication, perhaps the most accurate statement is that most law schools function both as
an academic setting and as a trade school.
61. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, Douglas, JJ.,
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With similar flourish, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court
reiterated:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.
'The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools.' The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace
of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.... To impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation.62
Finally, in Shelton v. Tucker, the Court held "[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of
63
American schools.,
In Healy v. James, these principles of law eventually led the
Supreme Court to require a public university to recognize Students for a
Democratic Society as an official student organization. 64 This occurred
because the Court held withholding such a "stamp of approval" cast "a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" through "subtle governmental
interference" even though the university did not prohibit student
members from speaking or meeting on campus. 65 It is impossible to
square this holding, and the constitutional principles that led to it, with a
bar admission rule that stifles online education in favor of an orthodox
"bricks-and-mortar" education, especially in view of the strides that have
been made in recent years by Internet technology. Stifling the freedom
to engage in online education casts-and threatens to cast-a far greater
"pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" than the mere failure to give a
student organization an official "stamp of approval." And if academic
freedom should be aggressively protected under the First Amendment
from even "subtle governmental interference," then such protection
should extend to the use of the Internet for educational communication
and association. This conclusion is perhaps best illustrated by way of a
concurring) (emphasis added).
62. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
63. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
64. Healy, 408 U.S. at 186-89.
65. Id. at 196-97 (Douglas, J. concurring) (declaring "[s]tudents as well as faculty
are entitled to credentials in their search for truth").

2007]

PAST THE PALL OF ORTHODOXY

thought experiment.
It is the year 1466. Thirty years ago, Johannes Guttenberg invented
the movable-type printing press. That invention is now resulting in an
explosion of book publication. Libraries of knowledge that were once
restricted to monasteries, nobles and a handful of universities are
increasingly available to the masses. There is talk of a "Renaissance" of
classical philosophy and culture. Fearing for their job security, a
collection of university scholars and guild masters adopt educational
standards that prohibit "book learning" in favor of face-to-face lectures
and handwritten scroll-reading. A number of German and Italian
principalities then decide to recognize exclusively the accreditation
decisions of this collection of scholars and guild masters. Entry into
various occupations is then restricted based upon whether the entrant has
graduated from an accredited center of learning.
Is there any doubt that this sort of ban on "book learning" would
have imposed a "straightjacket" upon Europe's intellectual development?
In view of the revolutionary educational potential of Internet schooling,
an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited law schools undermines academic freedom because it impedes
intellectual development in the legal field. But can states be held
constitutionally responsible for discriminating against online speech and
association when such discrimination originates with the accreditation
decisions of a private entity? The short answer is yes.
V.

States that Restrict Bar Eligibility to Graduates of ABA-Accredited
Law Schools are Constitutionally Responsible for the Predictable
Diminishment in Protected Internet Speech and Association
The bottom line is that the "decision to recognize" an "official

accreditation agency is undoubtedly state action ...and must comply

with the constitution., 66 Moreover, the exclusive recognition of only one
accreditation agency clearly employs the state's coercive power. By
extension, the state should be held constitutionally responsible for media
discrimination when it restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited law schools.
Any other conclusion would lead to
constitutional absurdity.
Imagine, for example, a private accreditation organization that
ordinarily would not accredit law schools that admitted AfricanAmericans. A state that recognized such an entity as its exclusive
66. Timothy Sandefur, Note, Dinosaur TRACS: The Approaching Conflict Between
Establishment Clause Jurisprudenceand College Accreditation Procedures, 7 NEXUS J.
Op. 79, 86 (2002) (relying on Med. Inst. of Minnesota v. NATTS, 817 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.
1987)).
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official accreditation agency would find itself in considerable
constitutional jeopardy. This is because it is "axiomatic that a state may
not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it
is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish." 67 Likewise, a state should
be held constitutionally responsible for media discrimination when it
promotes such discrimination by exclusively recognizing a private
accreditation agency that ordinarily engages in media discrimination.
This contention is further supported
by the Supreme Court's holding in
68
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona.
In Bates, the Supreme Court struck down the Arizona State Bar's
adoption of the ABA's ethical rules against lawyer advertising as
violative of the First Amendment.69 It is hard to imagine a different
result would have been reached, if the Arizona State Bar had instead
promulgated a rule that shifted its advertising disciplinary investigations
to the ABA and then restricted bar membership in accordance with the
ABA's independent disciplinary decisions based on the very same ethical
rules. After all, if states cannot themselves engage in conduct that
diminishes protected speech and association, they should not gain
constitutional immunity by deferring to private processes that ordinarily
result in the same thing. Indeed, this very point was recently made by
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In Centerfor Democracy & Technology v. Pappert,the law at issue
prohibited the dissemination of child pornography over the Internet and
gave private ISPs independent discretion over how to restrict access to
child pornography.7 ° Pointing to such independence, the government
mounted a state action defense, claiming it could not be held responsible
under the First Amendment for how private ISPs chose to restrict access
to child pornography. 7 1 The court rejected the government's contention
67.

This constitutional axiom was repeatedly enforced in cases where local

governments tried to evade 14th Amendment requirements (and sanctions for noncompliance with desegregation orders) by shifting management and control over public
facilities to private organizations that would then "independently" maintain segregated
facilities. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464 (1973) (citing Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 476 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (citations omitted); cf Edmunson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991) (observing the rule "[i]f a
government confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employees
or officials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race
neutrality").
68. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
69. Id.
70. 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 649-51 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
71. The court in Centerfor Democracy observed that,
[d]efendant argues that this overblocking does not violate the First Amendment
because it resulted from decisions made by ISPs, not state actors. According
to defendant, ISPs have 'options for disabling access that would and will not
block any, or as many, sites as Plaintiffs claim were blocked in the past' and
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out of hand in light of evidence that existing technology could only block
both protected and unprotected speech.72
Like the technological limitations that had the practical effect of
causing private ISPs to censor protected speech in Pappert,the ABA's
accreditation decisions are constrained by standards that ordinarily
prohibit online JD programs.73 As in Pappert, the government cannot
fairly disclaim constitutional responsibility for the suppression of
protected speech and association by private parties when such
suppression is the practical result of the government's own regulation.
Despite the foregoing arguments, states that restrict bar eligibility to
graduates of ABA-accredited schools might still attempt to disclaim
constitutional responsibility for media discrimination by contending that
independent market mechanisms are responsible for any devaluation of
(and consequent reduction in) Internet speech and association; and that
bar admission rules, unlike regulations prohibiting the distribution of
child pornography, do not directly cause the diminishment of First
Amendment activities. This argument would be based on recent cases
holding that the First Amendment is not offended by regulations that
make certain kinds of speech unprofitable through independent market
mechanisms.74 The operative principle of this line of precedent seems to
be that financial disincentives alone cannot violate the First Amendment
unless they are directly imposed by the government by way of outright
taxation or forced-escrow requirements.75 Following this reasoning, a
law that imposed a discriminatory tax on online schools and their
students might entail constitutionally problematic media discrimination,
but not a bar admission rule that absolutely prohibits online law school
graduates entry to the bar. In other words, the state could prohibit
graduates of online JD programs from earning a living and then dodge
the First Amendment when the educational market predictably reacts by
generating substantially less protected Internet speech and association
than would otherwise be the case. Such reasoning, however, disregards
the choice of which filtering method to use was 'completely the decision of the
ISPs....

The Court rejects this argument.

Id. at 650-51.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
74. Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2005)
(holding that in cases where financial disincentives to violate the First Amendment, "the
government, not waning market demand" must be "directly responsible for the financial
disincentive to speak"); Storer Cable Commc'ns v. Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518,
1562 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (holding "[i]f Storer Cable loses some of the programming it
desires because its program suppliers choose to leave the market rather than comply with
a valid law, 'the statute results,' at most, 'in an infringement upon plaintiffs profits, not
its First Amendment rights').
75. Wine and Spirits Retailers,418 F.3d at 48.
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the well-established rule that "[w]hat the First Amendment precludes the
government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government
from accomplishing indirectly. 76
Generally, government action that creates financial disincentives to
engage in protected speech and association implicates the First
Amendment, regardless of whether they are content-based or contentneutral.7 7 In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, for example, the Court rebuffed New York in its
attempt to prohibit criminals from financially benefiting from the sale of
books about their crimes, deeming such "Son-of-Sam" laws
unconstitutional content-based regulation. 78 Content-neutral honoraria
bans for public employees have met the same fate.79 Ineach case, the
Court held that the First Amendment was violated by regulations that
created financial disincentives to engage in protected speech, and the
holdings did not turn on the particular regulatory mechanism used to
achieve the disincentive. There is no reason to depart from this general
rule when a regulatory body uses government power to distort a market
in such a way that market mechanisms produce the same financial
disincentive. Permitting states to adopt regulations that dry-up market
demand for online schools would create a loophole in the First
Amendment.
Defenders of states that exclusively recognize ABA accreditation

76. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 78 (1990); see generally
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (holding "[t]he denial of a public benefit may
not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to
achieve what it may not command directly"); see also Cappetto v. Bd. of Educ., 526 F.
Supp. 710, 715-16 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding "a course of conduct intended to discourage
and intimidate teachers from associating together" by changing job titles and work areas
violated the First Amendment).
77. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Transportation Alternatives, Inc. v. New York, 218 F. Supp. 2d
423, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding "section 2-10 violates the First Amendment by
allowing the Parks Department to charge higher permit fees because a for-profit company
is underwriting or sponsoring the event").
78. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116 (holding the Son-of-Sam law "singles
out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other
income, and it is directed only at works with a specified content.., the statute plainly
imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content") (citing Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)); see also United States
Satellite Broad. Co., Inc. v. Robert Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding "the Boxing Act tax 'singles out income derived from expressive activity for a
burden the state places on no other income,' by creating 'a financial disincentive' to
broadcast telecasts with a particular content ... the Boxing Act therefore violates the
First Amendment unless it passes strict scrutiny").
79. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1991)
(holding "[t]he honoraria ban imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under the
First Amendment") (citations omitted).
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might also advance a "state action" defense to the proposed media
discrimination theory based on Blum v. Yaretsky. 80 There, the Supreme
Court held that a state agency was not constitutionally responsible for
patient transfer decisions in private nursing homes, rejecting the
argument that the agency's adjustment of Medicaid benefits in response
to such decisions made the state complicit in the transfer decision as a
joint actor. 8' In rejecting this argument, the Court observed that the
transfer decisions were based on independent professional medical
judgment that was not in any way influenced by the agency or otherwise
entangled with state coercive power. 82
It might be tempting for some states to contend that charging them
with media discrimination under the proposed theory is no different than
the failed attempt in Blum to hold a state agency responsible for nursing
home transfer decisions. They would likely argue that an ABA
accreditation restriction does not adopt the ABA's anti-online schooling
accreditation standards, but only responds to the ABA's independent
professional judgment in making accreditation decisions. This argument,
however, would disregard the Supreme Court's pointed observation in
Blum that only the nursing home's transfer procedures and decisions
were being challenged, and not the agency's benefit adjustment
procedures or decisions. 83 By contrast, the proposed theory of media
discrimination challenges only the bar admission rule that recognizes the
ABA as the state's exclusive accreditation agency, it does not challenge
the ABA's underlying accreditation standards or decisions. This is not
just clever posturing of the proposed media discrimination theory; unlike
the challenge mounted in Blum, the proposed theory cannot be said even
to originatewith the ABA's private action in a relevant sense.
In the sense of identifying the source of the alleged constitutional
injury, the Supreme Court observed that the theory in Blum originated
with independent private action and not state action. 84 This is because
the private patient transfer decisions in Blum would have caused the
80. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
81. Id. at 1006-07
82. Id. at 1007-09.
83. Id. at 1005. The Court observed that,
[riespondents, however, do not challenge the adjustment of benefits, but the
discharge or transfer of patients to lower levels of care without adequate notice
or hearings. That the State responds to such actions by adjusting benefits does
not render it responsible for those actions. The decisions about which
respondents complain are made by physicians and nursing home administrators,
all of whom are concededly private parties. There is no suggestion that those
decisions were influenced in any degree by the State's obligation to adjust
benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically necessary care.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1003.
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complained-of injury (i.e., inappropriate transfer to a lower standard of
care) regardless of state action. By contrast, under the proposed media
discrimination theory, there would be no cognizable constitutional
"injury" without state action.
After all, the proposed media
discrimination theory arises from the contention that restricting bar
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited schools diminishes Internet
speech and association. If the ABA were not established by law as the
exclusive accreditation agency for a given jurisdiction, its preferences
regarding online schooling would have no necessary effect on demand
for Internet communication and association-the impact of the ABA's
preferences would be left entirely to the decisions of individuals in the
educational market, which cannot be predicted, much less ascribed to
state action. In other words, the ABA's discriminatory approach to
Internet schooling, standing alone, is not the basis of the proposed media
discrimination theory. Only the governmental decision to recognize the
ABA as a state's exclusive law school accreditation agency necessarily
reduces the usefulness of online schooling, which necessarily suppresses
market demand for online schooling, which, in turn, necessarily devalues
and diminishes Internet communication and association from what would
otherwise be the case. In short, although the decision to discriminate
against the Internet originates with the ABA's private action, the injury
underpinning the proposed media discrimination theory originates with
state action-unlike the theory rejected in Blum.
In sum, an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited schools discriminates against the Internet medium,
devalues online educational communication, reduces the amount of
protected speech and association, and, thereby, interferes with the liberty
of circulation and academic freedom protected by the First
Amendment-predictably reinforcing
what scholars have described as
85
content.
academic
in
uniformity

85.

See supra note 58.
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VI. An Admission Rule that Absolutely Refuses Graduates of Online
J.D. Programs from Sitting for the State Bars Should Invoke and
Fail Heightened Judicial Scrutiny under the First Amendment
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in the recent case of
Mothershed v. Arizona suggests how courts should review bar admission
rules that prohibit graduates of online law schools from practicing law. 86
There, the Court of Appeals applied intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment to bar admission rules establishing pro hac vice and general
admission qualifications for licensure in the State of Arizona.8 7 It did so
based on the constitutional claims advanced by a resident attorney who
was licensed by an out-of-state jurisdiction.88 The attorney invoked
overbreadth standing to advance the claim that Arizona's bar admission
rules interfered with and chilled the First Amendment right of Arizonans
to consult with an out-of-state attorney.8 9 Although the Court of Appeals
sustained the constitutionality of the challenged admission rules as being
content neutral and narrowly tailored, 90 it is significant that the court
applied intermediate scrutiny to what are commonly regarded as
occupational regulations of the legal profession.
In doing so,
Mothershed consciously followed established precedent that has
repeatedly upheld the right to hire and communicate with legal counsel
as falling under the free speech and association protections of the First
Amendment. 9' Other courts have similarly applied heightened First
86. 410 F.3d 602, 610-12 (9th Cir. 2005).
87. Id.at 612.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 611-12.
91. Id. at 610-12 (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)
(striking down ethical rule charging union with unauthorized practice of law by engaging
in policy of advising members to use specific attorneys, holding "[a] State could not, by
invoking the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way
the right of individuals and the public to be fairly representedin lawsuits authorized by
Congress to effectuate a basicpublic interest") (emphasis added); United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
In holding
unconstitutional the declaration that the union was engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law by employing a salaried lawyer, the Court in United Mine Workers stated that,
[t]he First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left
government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so
long as no law is passed that prohibitsfree speech, press, petition, or assembly
as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the
exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were
enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative
competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of
dealing with such an evil.
389 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added); see Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir.
2000); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding "[tihe right to
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Amendment scrutiny to other regulations that would otherwise seem to
be occupational in nature.92
Nevertheless, despite a respectable pedigree, Mothershed's
application of First Amendment scrutiny to an occupational regulation
might appear to clash with the principles articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lowe v. S.E. C.93 There, citing a number of earlier cases, Justice
White seemingly observed in his concurrence that the First Amendment
is not implicated by generally applicable occupational regulations
governing "the personal nexus between professional and client," such as
between attorney and client.94 But the Supreme Court's prior and
subsequent holdings, and indeed Justice White's own views, are
considerably more nuanced.
Justice White acknowledged in Lowe, for example, that
[w]here the personal nexus between professional and client does not
exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is
directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as
legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental
impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as
such. 95

Bar admission rules, unlike ethical rules, fall into this category in so far
as they typically restrict access to the legal profession long before client
contact is made. Moreover, even Justice White conceded that in the case
of occupational regulations aimed at personal dealings between
professionals and clients, "it is possible that conditions the government
might impose on entry into a profession would in some cases themselves
violate the First Amendment." 96 Again, this analysis indicates that even
if all bar admission rules do not implicate the First Amendment, some
might. In fact, as will be discussed below, the justification for applying
heightened scrutiny to bar admission rules is reinforced by Supreme
Court precedent holding that the First Amendment is implicated by
occupational regulations that impede too much protected speech and
association.
retain and consult an attorney... implicates not only the Sixth Amendment but also
clearly established First Amendment rights of association and free speech").
92. See, e.g., Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (applying First
Amendment analysis to licensure of psychologists); Walker v. Flitton, 364 F. Supp. 2d
503 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (applying First Amendment analysis to law prohibiting unlicensed
individuals from being involved in the sale of preneed funeral services).
93. See 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Mothershed's Analysis Makes Sense Because Bar Admission Rules
Can Impede too Much ProtectedSpeech and Association to be
Immune from FirstAmendment Scrutiny

To determine whether occupational regulations with large impacts
on expressive and associational activities should be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has used
what amounts to a balancing test. In Thomas v. Collins, for example, the
U.S. Supreme Court utilized First Amendment heightened scrutiny to
strike down a registration/disclosure requirement for union organizers.9 7
Rejecting the government's assertion that the requirement did not
implicate the First Amendment because it was only incidental to a
comprehensive economic regulatory regime for organized labor, the
Court said:
The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amendment's
safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity.
And it does not resolve where the line shall be drawn in a particular
case merely to urge, as Texas does, that an organization for which the
rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is one "engaged
in business activities" or that the individual who leads it in exercising
these rights receives compensation for doing so. Nor, on the other
hand, is the answer given, whether what is done is an exercise of
those rights and the restriction a forbidden impairment, by ignoring
the organization's economic function, because those interests of
workingmen are involved or because they have the general liberties
of the citizen, as appellant would do. These comparisons are at once
too simple, too general, and too inaccurate to be determinative.
Where the line shall be placed in a particular application rests, not on
such generalities, but on the concrete clash of particular interests and
the community's relative evaluation both of them and of how the one
98
will be affected by the specific restriction, the other by its absence.
In essence, the Court engaged in a weighing of speech impacts versus
non-speech regulatory purposes in determining whether or not to
characterize an occupational regulation as implicating the First
Amendment.
Similarly, in Riley v. National Federationof the Blind, the Supreme
Court struck down licensure, contracting restrictions and disclosure
requirements for professional charitable solicitors-repeatedly rejecting
the argument that comprehensive non-speech, anti-fraud regulatory
purposes were sufficient to render the speech impact of such regimes

97.
98.

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 519, 534-35, 538, 542-43 (1945).
Id.
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immaterial under the First Amendment.99 The Court emphasized the
regulation of professional charitable solicitors should be analyzed under
the First Amendment because of its effect in substantially reducing "the
quantity of expression," further stating "[w]hether one views this as a
restriction of the charities' ability to speak, or a restriction of the
professional fundraisers' ability to speak, the restriction is undoubtedly
one on speech, and cannot be countenanced here."' 00
Taken together, prior to Mothershed, the Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that occupational regulations implicate heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment where the weight of speech and
associational impacts swamp the weight of the regulatory regime's nonspeech regulatory purposes.' 0 ' Although "liberty of circulation" doctrine
was not articulated in Thomas or Riley, the goal of ensuring structural
logically connects their
protections exist for the free circulation of ideas
02
holdings to the core of the First Amendment. 1
There is a natural progression under the First Amendment from
Thomas and Riley to Mothershed. The regulations in both Thomas and
Riley can be seen as directly analogous to the bar admission rules in
Mothershed. After all, non-compliance with any of these regulatory
regimes effectively precluded work in a speech-oriented profession,
which, in turn, precluded speech and association both by the affected
professional and by those the professional would otherwise representsuch as potential union members, charities and clients. In short, the
regulatory regime addressed in each case imposed what was a
99. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 784-87, 791 (1988); see also
Maryland Sect. of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-55, 968-69 (1984)
(holding "[w]hether the charity is prevented from engaging in First Amendment activity
by the lack of a solicitation permit or by the knowledge that its fundraising activity is
illegal ifit cannot satisfy the percentage limitation, the chill on the protected activity is
the same") (emphasis added); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
632, 636, 639 (1980) (observing "solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues.., without solicitation the flow
of such information and advocacy would likely cease"); Bellotti v. Telco Commc'ns,
Inc., 650 F. Supp. 149, 151-53 (D. Mass. 1986) (observing "[tihe issue before the Court
is whether ...a non-waivable percentage limitation on the compensation of professional
solicitors, is an allowable economic regulation of the solicitor, or whether it
impermissibly intrudes on the free speech rights of charitable organizations" and holding
the limitation violated free speech rights).
100. Id.
101. With respect to regulatory regimes involving legally mandatory marketing
schemes, both the majority and the dissenters have advocated a similar type of analysis
that asks if the regime's impact on protected speech and associational interests can be
fairly seen as "germane" or "incidental" to a "comprehensive" non-speech regulatory
purpose. Compare United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415-16, 420-21
(2001) with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997).
102. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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commensurate restraint on protected speech and associational
relationships. Moreover, although the regulatory regimes in Thomas and
Riley were justified as being incidental to other "comprehensive" nonspeech regulatory purposes, including the prevention of fraud, these
justifications were rejected by the Supreme Court. 0 3 It is hard to
imagine the non-speech regulatory purposes for the bar admission rules
in Mothershed are more weighty or central then those that were unable to
save the regulatory regimes in Thomas and Riley from First Amendment
scrutiny.
In fact, Mothershed advances a more modest application of First
Amendment principles to a putative non-speech regulatory regime than
what could have been supported by a logical extension of Riley. In Riley,
the Court's First Amendment analysis considered the speech impacts of
the challenged regulations on both professional charitable solicitors and
the charities themselves-declaring, in effect, it did not matter whose
speech was impacted, all that mattered was that speech was being
restricted.10 4 In this respect, Riley would seem to provide support for the
contention that attorneys have a personal claim under the First
Amendment when regulations significantly hamper their ability to speak
for others. After all, the speech-activities of professional charitable
fundraisers are very similar to those of attorneys in that both typically are
paid a fee for speaking on behalf of another, rather than advancing their
own personal viewpoints.
Riley also applied strict scrutiny. 0 5
Mothershed, however, did not go that far; it only analyzed the First
Amendment rights of clients in the context of an attorney advancing a
client's constitutional claim based on overbreadth standing-and it only
applied intermediate scrutiny. 10 6 From this vantage point, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals was quite restrained in its constitutional
analysis and sensitive to the unique concerns addressed by the regulation
of the legal profession.
Furthermore, Mothershed does not stand for the proposition that all
bar admission rules necessarily trigger First Amendment scrutiny. The
title "Officer of the Court" was not disregarded by the Court of Appeals
as a mere platitude. The Court was cognizant that the conduct of the
legal profession is central to the governmental administration of justice
and warrants special regulatory consideration.10 7 Indeed, the practice of
law is significantly different from other occupations in that attorneys
regularly wield the coercive power of the State directly or indirectly
103.

Riley, 487 U.S. at 795; see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).

104.

Riley, 487 U.S. at 794-95.

105.

Id.

106. Mothershed v. Arizona, 410 F.3d 602, 610-12 (9th Cir. 2005).
107. Id. at611-12

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

through the initiation of lawsuits, the service of subpoenas, and threats of
legal action. Correspondingly, there are undoubtedly weighty nonspeech regulatory purposes behind some bar admission rules, against
which any speech impact might reasonably be viewed as incidental and
unprotected by the First Amendment. Even so, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals was well-within the scope of the principles laid down in
Thomas and Riley when it applied intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment to bar admission rules that prohibited residents of Arizona
from consulting with attorneys who happen to be licensed by other
jurisdictions. The argument for such heightened scrutiny is at least as
persuasive in the context of admission rules that enforce media
discrimination.
B.

Mothershed's Analysis WarrantsApplying FirstAmendment
Scrutiny to Admission Rules that Absolutely Restrict Bar Eligibility
to GraduatesofABA-Accredited Law Schools

The "speech impact" of an admission rule that absolutely restricts
bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools is much
broader than that of the bar admission rules in Mothershed. Such a rule
is not only a restraint on consultative relationships (as in Mothershed), it
devalues and diminishes educational Internet speech and association by
law schools, their professors and students for no other reason than that it
occurs online. 10 8 In view of the growing body of evidence that online
schooling meets or exceeds the educational outcomes of "bricks and
mortar" schooling, 0 9 it is becoming increasingly apparent that this
distinct and discriminatory speech impact lacks any significant
countervailing non-speech regulatory purpose. Even more significantly,
where a given regulation poses a risk of media discrimination, the
Supreme Court has already observed that "laws that single out the press,
or certain elements thereof, for special treatment 'pose a particular
danger of abuse by the State,' and so are always subject to at least some
degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny."' "0 Consequently,
there is even greater reason to apply heightened First Amendment
scrutiny to an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools than to the admission rules at issue in
Mothershed. Moreover, the absolutism of recognizing the ABA as the
exclusive accreditation agency of the state tips the balance in favor of
deeming such a rule unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny, unlike
108. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
110. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.E.C., 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (citing Arkansas
Writer's Project v. Ragland (1987)).
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the rules that were upheld in Mothershed.
C. The Absolutism of Establishingthe ABA as the Exclusive
Accreditation Agency of the State WarrantsDeeming Such an
Admission Rule UnconstitutionalEven under Intermediate Scrutiny
The bar admission rules upheld in Mothershed were deemed
sufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand intermediate scrutiny because
they advanced a legitimate state interest without significantly impacting
speech and association unrelated to this purpose."'
To support this
holding, the Court observed, in part, that the rules did not impose "a
blanket prohibition on the appearance of out-of-state attorneys in
Arizona courts."' 1 2 The same sort of observation cannot be made about a
bar admission rule that absolutely restricts bar eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools.
Even if aimed at the legitimate state interest of avoiding the expense
of individually evaluating the quality of every law school and the
competency of every graduate," 3 an absolute restriction on bar eligibility
to graduates of ABA-accredited schools has significant speech impacts
that are completely unrelated to this purpose. Not only does the rule
restrict the consultative freedom of potential clients of both competent
and incompetent law school graduates, it devalues and diminishes
educational Internet speech and association for no other reason that it
occurs online." 4 The sweep of such an admission rule is so broad that it
can only be seen as a prophylactic speech regulation5 that would fail even
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.'
In the final analysis, the real choice is not between evaluating the
quality of every law school and the competency of every graduate, or
only evaluating the competency of graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools; the real choice is between an absolutist prophylactic admission
rule or an admission rule that establishes ABA-accreditation as a
recognized signal of competency, but also allows for the possibility of
waiver for graduates of online JD degree programs in light of the ABA's
unfounded discrimination against Internet schooling.
Even under
intermediate scrutiny, states that continue to restrict bar eligibility to
111. Mothershed,410F.3dat6ll-12.
112. Id.at 612.
113. Cf Appeal of Murphy, 393 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 901
(1978) (holding investigating the legal education of every applicant would be "very
impractical").
114. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
115. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (applying the proposition
"[biroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect" in the context of
intermediate scrutiny).
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graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, without furnishing a waiver
process for graduates of online JD programs, should anticipate
constitutional litigation under the First Amendment, especially as
recognition of the educational value of the Internet continues to grow.
VII. Conclusion
States that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited
law schools not only punish graduates of online JD programs for daring
to have engaged in online educational communication, they necessarily
devalue educational communication and association over the Internet.
This, in turn, predictably diminishes the amount of protected Internet
speech and association in favor of traditional face-to-face communication
and association.
Such media discrimination is vulnerable to First Amendment attack
under theories that seek to protect liberty of circulation, academic
freedom and access to the legal profession-the lifeblood of which is
protected speech and association. Moreover, because of overbreadth
standing under the First Amendment, each of these theories can be
brought by any aggrieved graduate, student, law school or potential

client.' 16
In light of the foregoing, the ABA should be encouraged to continue
working towards developing accreditation standards that measure and
certify academic quality without sacrificing innovation to educational
orthodoxy. But states must not wait for the ABA's standards to evolve;
they should meet their constitutional obligations and furnish graduates of
online JD programs with an alternative pathway to licensure in the form
of a waiver process that takes into account objective demonstrations 117
of
competency, such as legal experience and licensure by other state bars.

116. See Sect. of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 958 (1984)
(holding a plaintiffs ability to invoke "overbreadth standing.., has nothing to do with

whether or not [his] own First Amendment rights are at stake" but instead depends upon
whether the plaintiff "satisfies the requirement of 'injury-in-fact,' and whether [he] can
be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in the case"); Mothershed,410 F.3d at 61012.
117. Cf Michael Ariens, Law School Branding And The Future Of Legal Education,
34 ST. MARY'S L. J. 301, 360-61 (2003), observing,

[t]he mantra, "the only constant is change," a refrain heard in most discussions
concerning the future of the legal profession, has long been absent from
discussions of the future of legal education. This day of reckoning can be
postponed for some time, perhaps as long as a decade. The ability of law
school graduates to repay the debt incurred in obtaining a law degree remains

difficult but manageable, and so long as interest rates remain low and the
market for lawyers remains sound, law schools can avoid change. But the
difference between Concord University School of Law tuition and average
private law school tuition continues to grow. The current absence of more than
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In this way, the door to a profession that is infused with the exercise of
First Amendment rights will open to individuals for whom the Internet is
simply the best-and perhaps the only-educational medium. Equally
important, ordinary citizens will be able to enjoy their First Amendment
rights more effectively because they will have greater access to qualified
legal counsel.

one entrepreneur in the legal education market is not likely to last ....
The
longer the wait, however, the greater the danger that change will be imposed
from without.

